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Argument Priority No. 14(b) 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS "STATEMENT OF FACTS" 
Plaintiff is concerned about several representations in 
Respondents brief which are made as "Statement of Fact" but 
which are actually arguments for Respondent's position rather 
than true factual representations. 
Paragraph 14 of Respondent's "Statement of Facts" 
simply is not an accurate statement of facts as represented. 
Contrary to the indications therein, Plaintiff testified that he 
specifically informed Defendant "around October" of 1985 that his 
income had significantly increased to "about $5,000.00 to 
1 
$6,000.00 a month." [Transcript: page 72, line 16 through 19.] 
Appellant further testified that he continued to discuss his 
increase in income through January of 1986 and thereafter. 
[Transcript: page 72, line 20 through page 73, line 3.] For 
Respondent to represent that "the Defendant provided no 
information regarding his income at the time the parties entered 
into the Stipulation either by a verbal affirmation or by 
providing any documentation of his income" is simply a 
misrepresentation and an attempt to take improper license where 
supposedly setting out to the Court accepted "Statements of 
Fact". Respondent was informed at the time of the Stipulation 
that Appellant's income had significantly increased and that the 
increase in income was the reason why Appellant was willing to 
raise child support by stipulation in excess of that earlier 
ordered by the Court. 
Like paragraph 14 of Respondent's Statement of Facts, 
paragraph 16 simply misstates an accepted fact in the case. 
Respondent alleges in her Brief that Exhibit "24" was "admitted 
... to show the disparity between what Plaintiff claimed as 
income at the time of trial in July, 1985 and his actual income 
as shown on his 1985 tax return." The citation provided to the 
Court would seem to support that allegation. The next five lines 
of the transcript following that citation, however, clearly show 
that the Court corrected that indication and clarified that 
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Exhibit "24" was not intended to show income during July of 1985 
but rather was "based on '84 income." [Transcript: page 54, line 
24 through 25.] This is a critical misrepresentation by 
Respondent which continues throughout her brief. Respondent 
attempts continually to represent to this Court that Appellant 
misrepresented his income in July of 1985. She does so by using 
a year-end tax return for the year 1985 which simply averages 
Appellant's income over that year between the low figure earned 
in July of 1985 (at the time of the prior hearing before the 
Court) and the high figure during the fall and winter months of 
1985 (long after the hearing before the Court). 
Appellant clearly and concisely testified that in July 
of 1985 (at the time of previous hearing before the Trial Court) 
he was earning approximately $2,131.58 per month as set out in 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "25" and that his income significantly 
increased in October and thereafter of 1985 to approximately 
$6,000.00 per month. [Transcript: page 71, line 5 through page 
73, line 13.] Using those facts out of context, Respondent has 
attempted to average Plaintiff's income throughout the year 1985 
in an attempt to argue before this Court (and the Trial Court) 
that Appellant misrepresented his income in July of 1985. Such 
an attempt is clearly improper and not factual. 
Respondent compounds her attempt at inaccurately 
stating fact in paragraph 17 when Respondent properly points out 
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that the Order entered in January 1986 "was not an accurate 
statement of the Plaintiff's income at 'that time'.11 It was not 
intended to reflect Plaintiff's income at "that time" but rather 
was clearly and properly intended to reflect Plaintiff's income 
as of the court hearing in July of 1985 and it clearly so states. 
It did in fact accurately reflect the Plaintiff's income as of 
July 1985 and there is no evidence whatsoever in the record to 
indicate otherwise. In other words, Plaintiff at no time 
misrepresented his income to the Court in July 1985 or 
thereafter. 
In paragraph 19 of Respondent's supposed "Statement of 
Facts" Respondent again mischaracterizes the clear facts by 
indicating that "the Plaintiff at no time disclosed his income to 
the Defendant when the parties entered into the Stipulation to 
increase child support." The Court is referred to the clear and 
concise testimony otherwise as referred to hereinabove. 
Respondent properly makes a statement of fact in 
paragraph 20 but attempts to draw a mischaracterized conclusion 
therefrom. Respondent does factually state that her counsel was 
not involved in the negotiations which resulted in the increase 
in child support in the fall of 1985. In fact, only the 
Plaintiff and Defendant themselves were involved in those 
negotiations. Respondent attempts, in her brief, however, to 
infer that the absence of discovery or direct involvement of her 
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counsel was at the behest of or an attempt by Plaintiff to 
misrepresent certain facts to her. On the contrary, Plaintiff 
clearly testified that he informed Defendant of his increase in 
income and his resulting willingness to pay additional child 
support which in and of itself resulted in the Stipulation to 
increase child support significantly over that previously ordered 
by the Court. Respondent continues the improper inference in 
paragraph 21 stating that Defendant's Motion to modify the 
pleadings to conform to the evidence were "based upon 
misrepresentations to the Court, misrepresentations to the 
Defendant and material omissions of fact by the Plaintiff.11 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Plaintiff made no 
misrepresentations to the Court, to Defendant or to anyone else 
at any time and to state otherwise as a "Statement of Fact" is 
clearly misleading and improper. 
Respondent further attempts to mischaracterize the 
facts surrounding the Stipulation by omitting to indicate that 
both parties were represented by counsel at all times and that 
counsel for both parties were fully involved in drafting and 
preparing the Stipulation itself for signature by their 
respective clients. The Stipulation went through several drafts 
in order to contain specific language acceptable to both parties 
and their counsel. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN ITS EQUITABLE 
POWERS WHEN IT RAISED CHILD SUPPORT AND A 
RETROACTIVE AWARD FOR INCREASED CHILD SUPPORT 
WOULD LIKEWISE BE IMPROPER 
Appellant does not disagree in principle with the 
"Principles of Review" or the "Utah Legal Principles Regarding 
Child Support" as set out in Point I, sub-points A, and B. of 
Respondent's Brief. Those principles do not, however, support 
the conclusion drawn by Respondent that the Court's increase in 
child support is an appropriate exercise of its equitable powers. 
The contrary is in fact true. Both case law and legal principles 
require that, where no substantial change of circumstances has 
occurred, the Court has no equitable power to modify a child 
support award. The Trial Court in the case at bar specifically 
and uncontradictingly found that no substantial change in 
circumstances had occurred and, as a result thereof, improperly 
modified the child support award. This Court is referred to the 
case law set out in Appellant's principal brief in this matter 
which will not be repeated hereat. 
Respondent goes further in the arguments in her brief 
before this Court in an attempt to allege that the Trial Court 
"should have increased the child support and made it retroactive 
to January, 1986 when Mr. Gates began making $6,000.00 per 
month". Such a request is neither justified nor proper before 
this Court. A claim for retroactive child support was not made 
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before the Trial Court and is not proper to be raised for the 
first time upon appeal. See Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 
17 (Utah 1989) wherein the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
cites the well settled principle that "we have held that in the 
absence of exceptional circumstances, this court will not 
entertain a claim raised for the first time on appeal." Id. at 
19. See also B.N.H.. In re, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1989) 
and State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). 
Not only is Respondent's claim in this regard 
improperly raised for the first time on appeal, but the facts of 
the case clearly show no merit to the claim. The Stipulation 
entered into by and between the parties in April of 1986 states 
unequivocally that "the parties acknowledge that this Stipulation 
" . . . is based upon circumstances of each 
party as they presently exist and, subject to 
the Court's approval, the Divorce Decree and 
subsequent orders may be modified upon this 
Stipulation and subject to its terms being 
incorporated therein." [Emphasis added] 
At the time of entering into the Stipulation between the parties, 
Appellant was making the $6,000.00 per month income referred to 
by Respondent in her brief. Clearly, therefore, those 
circumstances existed at the time of the Stipulation and are not 
subject to a retroactive child support order. 
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II. RESPONDENT'S CLAIM OF ERROR BY THE TRIAL COURT IN 
AWARDING MR. GATES THE TAX EXEMPTION FOR THE 
PARTIES' MINOR CHILD IS CLEARLY NOT WELL TAKEN 
Like Respondent's request for retroactive child 
support, Respondent's claim that the Trial Court erred in 
awarding Mr. Gates the tax exemption for the parties7 minor child 
is raised for the first time in Respondent's Brief. It was 
neither raised in the Trial Court nor, of perhaps more 
significance, did Respondent appeal from that decision in a 
timely fashion before this Court. As such, Respondent is clearly 
barred from raising the same for the first time in her 
Respondent's Brief. 
Of perhaps more importance, however, is the fact that 
Respondent's claim is simply wrong under the principles of law 
adopted by and stated by this Court. This Court is specifically 
referred to its opinion in the case of Motes v. Motes, 121 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah 1989) wherein the court clearly and 
unequivocally stated, after considering exactly the arguments put 
forth by Respondent in her brief that, 
we conclude the 1984 amendment to 
Section 152 does not divest state courts of 
their traditional power to allocate federal 
tax dependency exemptions, and state courts 
have the power to order a custodial parent to 
execute a declaration in favor of the 
non-custodial parent. The contrary position 
followed by only a minority of jurisdictions 
was not intended by Congress, especially given 
the lack of an expressed termination of the 
traditional approach of state courts to 
dependency-exemption allocation. Finally, the 
practical effect of a contrary ruling would 
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essentially prevent state courts from taking 
permissible advantage of progressive tax 
brackets and maximizing the resources 
available to support divorcing parents and 
their families. [Emphasis added] Id. at 55. 
The Trial Court properly continued the exemption for 
the parties7 minor child in favor of Appellant in light of the 
traditional equitable principles considered in such a decision 
but also due to the fact that the parties themselves had so 
stipulated in the April 10, 1986 Stipulation from which the court 
found there had been no material change in circumstances. 
Respondent's raising of said issue in this appeal is without 
merit and is frivolous. 
III. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD APPELLANT COSTS AND REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR PROSECUTING THIS APPEAL 
Appellant has argued in his main brief that this Court 
should set aside the award of attorney's fees made by the Trial 
Court in favor of Respondent and that this Court should in fact 
award Appellant his attorney's fees in connection with the 
proceedings in the Trial Court. For those same reasons as well 
as the reasons and principles set out in Respondent's Brief in 
Point IV, this Court should likewise award Appellant his costs 
and a reasonable attorney's fee for the prosecution of this 
appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court was clearly not acting within its 
equitable powers when it raised child support in light of a 
finding of no material change of circumstances and where there 
was no misrepresentation of any kind. Likewise, any 
consideration of a retroactive award for increased child support 
would clearly be improper at this stage of the proceedings. 
The Trial Court acted well within its discretion in 
awarding the continuing tax exemption for the minor child to 
Appellant. 
This Court should set aside the Trial Court's award of 
attorneys' fees to Respondent below and should award Appellant 
reasonable attorneys' fees for the proceedings below and for the 
prosecution of this Appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of December, 1989. 
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